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Introduction
'Chis paper uses experiments to investigate the evolution of communication.
It considers both the dynamic stability of pre-established meanings and the convergence toward meaning(ul messagea from initially meaningleae messages. This is done in an environment where imperfect incentive alignment between agents creates barriers to eBective communication.
There is strong applied interest in communication with imperfect incentive aligmnenL In economirs, Stein [1989] examines communication between the Federal Reserve Board and market tradera. The Board wants to communicate part of its intentions bul not all; otherwise, tradere will take elrategie positions that negate the policies of the Board. Similarly, in polilical science, Austen-Smith [1990] showa that preference divereity among legislators limite the scope for information transmission in debate. In accounting, Newman and Saneing [1993] analyze voluntary disclosures made by management to its firm's shareholders. The incumbent firm and stockholders have common intereBts and accurate information helps stockholders with consumption amoothing. fiowever, the presence of a potential entrant, who obaervea the disclosure as well, createa an inceMive to understate earnings in order to deter entry.
Such situations are commonly represented through sender-receiver games.
In a sendcr-receiver game a privatcly inforrned sender sends a message to a recciver who then takes an action in reaponsc to the message. The payoffs of both players depend on the private information of the sender and the reeeiver'ã ction, but not on the message sent. Sender-receiver games tend to have a large number of equilibria and thus pose a serious equilibrium selectiat problem. The focus in the applied literattue, which builds on the work by Crawford and Sobel [1982] (CS), ie on the limits that incentives impose on communication. For thia reason, this literature has concentrated on the nwst influential equilibria (Austen-Smith and Banke [1995] ), i.e., the equilibria that induce Lhe greatest number of different receiver utions. limier some regularity assumptions that are Lypically satisfied in the applicd literatttre, these equilibria also ez anfe Pareto-dominate the less influenlial eyuilibria. In every eyuilibrium of a CS game, if preferences are imperfectly aligned, subsets of Ute Lype set send a common message, which dislinguishea them (rom oUter such seta; i.e., equilibria take the form of partition equilibria.
"Chus nMSSages are on)y partially informative unlike in the work of Grossman [19R1] anJ 111ilgrom [1981] where messages are assumcd to be verifiable and turn uul. t.o bc fully revraling in equilibrium. Without such verifiability, lhe mnet in-Iluential equilibria induce the finest partition of the type set and in that sense ronvcy thc mar;t iuformation.t
Therc is strong intuition that in sender-receiver games wilh sufficientlỹ Note that infonnativeneu of an equilibrium is neceuary but not~ufFcimt for it to be in1l~Mntiwl, becwu di(ferent po~terior belief~nuY induce idmtical bet replin or beceuae .m:.ll variat~ons in thr po~teriar tnay nol be~ufficimt to dter best teplin. 1 cloeely aligned incentivee at kast some information will be rcvealed by the sender. However, this intuitán is not captured by equilibrium refinements like strategic stability (Kohlberg and Mertens [1986] ), which have etrong implicatione in games with costly signaling.
There is a literature that addresses the problem of equilibrium aelection in aender-receiver games that formulates refinements by appealing to the existence of a commonly understood language, Farrell [I993], Matthewe, OkunoFujiwara and Postlewaite [1991] , Rabin [1990] . Uninformative equilibria are eliminated by postulating that messages are interpreted consiatent with their literal meaning unlesa this violates strategic aspecta of the game. Unfortunately, in general none ot the influential equiGbria in CS games pass Farrell's test. This includes the favorite equilibria of the applied literature.
There are other limits to communication, which are not a direct result of the incentive conditions impaeed by equilibrium. There is the issue, related to the refinement arguments, that often the moet influential equilibria have properties that suggest they are unetable. Often in applied work, equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. Finally, simple misunderstandinga, where the intended meaning doea not malch the received meaning, are possibk and also deatabilising. Under these circumatancee, it is legitimate to ask whether the focua on influential or Pareto efficient equilibria is warranted.
We propoee a atringent test. We conaider bolh measagee with and without literal meaninga, and inveatigate whether and how meaningful communication evolves in games that satiafy a partial common infercat (PCIJ condition. PCI is a strong requirement uaed in both etandard and evolutionary gsme theory (Rabin and Sobel [1996) , Blume, Kim md Sobel [1993[, and Blume [1998] [1997] ) to predict meaningful communicatioa despite imperfect incentive alignment. We relate the PCI condition to the CS model and investigate the propaeed sekction criteria of influentiality, Pareto efficiency and refinements in the epirit of Farrell.
The advantages of looking at meaningful meseages are that (1) we obtain clean outcomes and (2) we get to obeerve degrsdation and recoding o[ meaninga.
}lere the focus is on loca! stability of communicative outcomes.
The attraction of ineaninglesa messagea ie that (1) we deal with a clearly delimited benchmark case, which permits us to consider variations of the mer sage space in a systematic way, (2) we reduce focal point eftects, which are not well understood, (3) we construct a reference point from which one can asaesa the contribution of a preexisting common Ianguage, (4) we make it easkr for dynamic instability to aflect informative outcomea, by removing the focal rok of a commonly understood language, (5) we do not have to poetulate the existence oí unused measages and can inatead rely on a theory that predicts that the dynamic procese itself will generate the ununed mesaagea, which are necessary to destaóilize uninformative outcomee, and (8) we can obcerve the mechanism by which uninformative equilibria become undone. Here the focus is on global convergence to communicative outcomes. hypothesis can be rejected with and without literal meanings. There are nontrivial dynamica even when measagea have litersl meanin~. Communicative outcomes are lesa likely to evolve, and, if they do, evolve more sbwly without a commonly underatood language. When we see communicstive outcomea, they tend to satisfy a pariiel common iatercst condition. Equilibria are useful guideposta for analyzing outcome8 but are not always obtained; e.g., we observe stable sucker behavior and adherence to focal meanings with literal meanings and, without literal meaninge, combinationa of actiona thal could not ccexist under any equilibrium. Selection criteria that discriminate among equilibria on the grounds of influentialily, ex ante efficiency or refinemente do not capture the systematic deviations from equilibrium play that we do obeerve. In addition they may both under-and overpredict the extent of communication; e.g.
we observe communication where refinements reject all equilibria, we observe a tendency toward partial pooling play where influentiality would predict full separation, and for one of our íncentive structurea we observe one of two powibk ex ante efficient equilibria in a given treatment, but not the other.
2 Theory and Hypotheses 'Phis section describes CS games, propoees variationa of CS gamea with experimentally salient incentives and discusses the selection criteria we wish to examine. We lormulate our hypothesea to evaluate (1) the mos4influentialequilibrium prediction, (2) the refinement prediction, (3) the most-efficientequilibrimn prediction and (4) the partial-common-interest prediction.
A sender-receiver game is a two-player game in which one player, the sender, has private inlormation and the other,the reteiver,takea an attion. Before the receiver lakes his action, the sender sende a message. Payoffs to both players depend solely on the sender's private in(ormation, his type, and on the recciver's action.
('rawford and Sobel analyze sender-receiver games with a continuum of types drawn from the unit interval in which the sender's and the receiver's preferences over actions are concave and in which the alignment of preferences can he expmssed hy a single parameter. As an example, they consider a model with quadratic preferences. The payoB to a sender of type t Gom aztion a is -(n -(t -} 6))'-, where b~0, and the receiver's payoff equals -(a -t)z. They show that in such games all cquilibria are partition equilibria; i.e., the type set ran hc partit.ioned into a finite number of intervals such that types belonging to the same interval send a common message and receive the same actron. 'Phe uu~ssagc of their paper is that rostkss communication can be efTective and that the informativeness of such communication depends on the alignment of preferenrrs, measured hy the parameter 6 in the quadratic model. For every value nf thr alignmcnl paramel.er 6, there exista a number N(b), such that there are partit.ion cyuilibtia with sizes (numbers of partitiott clements) N-1,...,N(6).
The maximal eize, N(b), is a nonincreaeing function of b.
The equilibria of eize N(b) receive the moat attention in the literature. Thia is sometimee juatified by pointing out that being moat influential confers saliency or by appealing to the ex ante efficiency of these equilibria. Unfortunately, refinements in the spirit of Farrell reject influential equilibria when they exist.
A direct experimental examination of CS gamea, while intríguing, runs into three principal difficultiea: ( 1) It is difficult to experimentally implement continuous type, message and action spaces, (2) the incentivea of marginal types (near partition boundariea) are not salient, and (3) it is impossible to disentangle the rolea of influentiality, efficiency, and refinements. For these reasons, we derive our canonical incentive structurea from a generalization of the quadratic example in which the pre[erence alignment parameter is a fundion of the type, b(t). Furthermore, we discretize the type space by representing classee of types by a eingle type whoee incentivm reflect those of a typical member in that claea.
Our objective ia to examine equilibrium selection criteria for sender-receiver gamea with partition equilibria of diNerent aizea, with and without literal meanings of ineesagea. Two o( theae criteria are commonly used in the applied literature. Influentiality aelects those equilibria that induce the maximal number of distinct receiver actiona. The efficiency criterion selects the ex ante eR'icient equilibria. Although the applied works informally appeal to a commonly understood Ianguage, the two criteria are ailent about the role such a language might play.
Refinements in the spirit of Farrell [1993~aelect equilibria that are robust to credible atatementa in a eommonly underetood Iangunge. Given a reference equilibrium, a statement "I belong lo the set of typea S" ia deemed credibk if (1) typea in S would want to make that atatement conditional on it being believed and ( 2) only typea in S would want to make that statement under that condition. Equilibria that pass the refinement test need not always exiat; for example, there may be only a pooling equilibrium, a set S may be able to credibly identify itaelf relative to that equilibrium but typea in the complement S~ot S would prefer to misrepresent themaelvee as members o( S rather than be identified. This may undermine the credibility of the self-identification of the set S and initiate a dynamic procesa that subverts the original meaning of the message "[ belong to the set of types S."z Partial common interest ( PCI) is an alternative way of expressing incentive alignment between senders and reteivera. The central idea is that one may be able to partition the type set in such a way that the sender is willing to credibly reveal information consiatent with that partition but not necesearily more. PCI is particularly well suited for making predictíons in environmenta where zThis is aneloaoua lo lhe eo called Sti~itz Critique o! equilibrium rcfinementa (.ee Cho snd Krcp [1967 [). FsrreU [1991 .ed s dynamic inlerpretslion a( lhie phenomenon. Rabin and Sobel [1996) ezamine a solulion concept llut take s rcfinement araument s Is Ferrrll s. a atartina poim but lhrouóh . quari-dmatnic Proceu avoida the ezi.lence problem. reaultina from lhe .ubvenion of ineaning. meanings evolve, either becausc no a pnori meanings are given, or becauae, ae above, given meaninga degrade over time. Intuitively, receivere alwaye prefer a finer partition and if subsets of sender typee prefer to be revealed as such, we expect there to be dynamic foreea to bring about that revelation. The PCI condition triea to ensure that thia proctxe ie a one-way atteet. Once eeparated, types from different partition elementa never have an incentive to be pooled again. 'fhe dynamic arguments to which PCI ia related requirc meesage spaces to be aufficiently largè. Therefore, in all of our implementatione we choee the meseage space to be Iarger than the type apace. Thia ensurea that none of the equilibria are strict and, for the gamea considered, ie auR'icient to render the PCI prediction valid.
We adopt the following more formal vereron of PCI 3 For a partition Z of the type set, denote the partition element containing type t by I(t), and kt BR(I(t)) be the set of best replies to beliefs supported on the aet of typea 1(t). p sender-receiver game satiafies PCI with respeet to the partition Z if (1) each type i atrictly prefere all actions in BR(I(t)) to all actions outside of thia set, and (2) BR(I(t)) n BR(I(t')) -8 N!(t) ;E I(t').
Condition (1) ensurea that information revelation that is only consiatent with the coarser partition is unatable. Conditions (1) and (2) together enaure that once information is revealed consistent with the finer partition, no kes informative outcotne can recur. Note that PCI, thue formulated, doea not make any reference to equilibria.
PCI permits us to predict communication without reference to equilibrium play. 'Chis is one reason for considering PCI ae a conservative predictive tool; PCI doea not commit itself to equilibrium. The other reason for viewing PCI as a conservative criterion is lhat it imposes strong conditions on the game's incentive structure. In the literature (Blunx, Kim and Sobel [1993J, Rabin and Sohel (1996J, and Blume [1996J (199TJ) PCI plays the role of a atrong sufficient condition for e(fective communication to arise. 1( we want to strengthen the predictive conteut of YC1, we can in addition require a prediction to be an equilibrium.
Our four selectíon criteria, although not neated, difter in etrength. For exainple, PCI docs not rule out. efficient equilibria. PCI equilibria always exial whcreay refinementa may reject all equilibria. Overall, PCI makea the moet conservative predictions in the games we examine, the ex ante efficiency predictions are slightly stronger, influentiality is atronger yet. Befinetnents cannot he ranked with influentiality; e.g., in two of our games Lhe predictions diRer. Ituwever, refinement criteria appcar to be quitc strong, given thal they may climinate all equilibria.~" We focua on the aimpleet poasibk games that permit us to consider partial information revelatán. This requires therc to be al kast three typea ( classes of types). To limit the large number of poeeible incentive atructures that can ariae even with only three typea, we require that ( 1) one sender type (type t~) prefers to be fully identified nnd (2) the other two types, tt and tZ, prefer to be identified as a partition element, {tt,t7} but not necessarily as individual types. Qualitatively, within the {tt,tz} ekment, three cases can arise: (1) both typea prefer to be fully identified, ( 2) none of the types prefer to be identificd, and (3) only one of the types prefers to be identified. In the third case we also diatinguish between two subcases, one were a separating equilibrium exists, and one where no such equilibrium exists. This givea us four canonical incentive structures to examine.
Our firat game (Game 1) is one where incentives are perfectly aligned. The diagram on the left grapha the alignment parameter as a function of type. Preferentee being perfectly aligned is expressed via D(t) -0 for all !. The typical types tt, ts, and t, can be thought of as the midpoints of the lhree intervals In a pooling equilibrium all types of the sender send a common message and the receiver's responae does not depend on the meseage. In this game there are also ta, ia lhc most pre(erred actàn for tYPe t~-" i.e. the actian thal maximisea -(a -t,J7. The psyoR (rom euh lypei most prekrted~ction ia poaitive, w~hich can be arhieved by adding a poaitive cotuNnl lo the corresponding CS p~yal(~. The payoRa (rom olher acliona mtut be atrictly lower; in the iMernl o( ulimcy re aet them equal to sero, inatrJd of deriving them from the quadruic utility funaim. The cotrtructian o(the finile repreaenlatiana far lhe other ósmec ia similer, strcuina sslirnt cheracleriatin, imtead of numerical detail. s multiple partial pooling equilibrium outcomes, each characterized by the aingk type who is fully identified in that equilibrium. Finally, compkte separation is an eyuilibrium outcome.
Complete aeparation ia moat influential. Given that it maximues both xnder and receiver payofta, it ie alao the unique efficient outcorne. Equilibria in which some type t is not fully identified do not pass the refinement test, ae that type can send a credible self-identifying meaaage. The game satufiet PCI with reapect to the finest partition. Thus, all four aelection criteria predict full xparation in this gatne.
Our second game ( Came 2) repreaenta a slight departurc Gom perfect incentive alignment. There is still a unique ex ante efficient outcome but for a given type ( tz), the receiver's optimal action, a~, ia nol identical to the sender'e optimal action, a4. This is a finite representation of an incentive structure with imper(ect incentive alignment, i.e. 6(t)~0 for some types. Here low types, in the interval [0,2~3) have a negative tr(t), and therefore prefer to pool wilh lower types; howevcr the incentive to misrepresent onea type is not atrong enough to rule out equilibria in which aubseta of [0,2~3) send dilferent meaaagea a a, a, In Came Y refinements sclect the separating equilibrium. So do influentiality aud c~ante etI'iciency. 1Ve use the PCI condition as follows: First, note that Gamc 2 satisfies PCI with respect to the trivial part.ition, which contains only Uic elenMUt I-(tt,t.,t~}. To check condition (1) (1). Finally, one cen check that PCI ia satisfied for no other, in particular no finer, partition. For the finest partition, this follows from the fact that az is the unique best reply to tz, while this type prefers action a~in válation of condition (1). In summary, the sender is willing to reveal information consistent with the partition {{tt,t7},{t~}}, but not neceraarily morc. And if the sender reveals his type to belong to an element 1, we expect the receiver to respond with an action in BR{I). This will be our PCI prediction for Game 2; the predictions for Games 3 and 4 can be derived in an slmost identical manner. In our next game, Game 3, the misalignment of preferences between senders and receivers becomes more severe. Game 3 is a finite repreeentatron of an incentive structure where low typea, [0, 1~3), prefer to overstate their true typee, and types in the interval (1~3, 2~3) like to understate their true types. In Game 3, while a fully separating equilibrium doea still exist, both types tl and tz prefer being pooled to being correctly identified S
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In this ganle refinementa rule out all equilibria because in both pooling and partial pooling equilibria type tl can credibly self-identify himself and thus destroy such equilibria. Influentiality, efficiency and PCI all aelect partial separation.
The throry concerning these games, as sketthed out above, maka predictáns about whether there will be communicatron, whether communicative outcontes satisfy a PCI condition, whether communicalive outcoma are supported by eyuilibria and whether these equilibria need to be ex ante efRcient, nwet influential or have to satisfy a refinement criterion. Accordingly, we formulate the following null-hypot.heses for all of our games: 111 Communical.ion hypotheais: For games which have a unique pooling action (Games 2-4), the most frequent action is the pooling action. For Game 1, the distribution of actions is independent of type.
PCI hypothesis:
The frequency of PCI-outcomes doa not exceed the frequency Gom a unifonn distribution.
II:S F:quilibrium hypotheses:
H3a Pooling hypotheaie: The frequency of pooling outcomes dces not exceed the uniform diatribution frequency.
H36 Partisl pooling hypotheais: The frequency of partial pooling outcomea does not exceed the uniform distribution frequency.
H3c Separation hypotheais: The frequency of aeparating outcomes does nM exceed the uniform diatribution frequency.
N3d Ex ante efficiency hypothesia: The frcquency of ex ante efficient equilibrium outcomes doea not exceed the uniform distribution frequency.
Hae Influentiality hypothesis: The frequency of moat influential equilibrium outcomea doea not exceed the uniform distribution frequency.
H3f Refinement hypotheais: The frcquency of equilibrium outcomes conaistent with Farrell's neologiam proofnesa test dces not exceed the uniform distribution frequency. Caveat: The neologism proo[nesa refinemeM does nol always make a prediction.
Design
The experiments were conducted uaing a aeries of population tohorts. A cohort conaisted of twelve partieipante: six aenden and six receivera. All participanta were recruited from undergraduate (sophomore and above) and graduate clasaes at the University of lowa. None of the participanta had previously taken part in or otherwise gained experience with this aeries of experiments. Upon arrival, players were seated at eeparate computer terminala and given a copy of the inatructions for the experiment 6 Since theee inatructiona were read aloud, we asaume that the information contained in them wae common knowledge. Each cohort played two aender-receiver games. First, all cohorts played 20 periods of Game 1 in Sesaion 1; subsequently, in Session II each cohort played 40 periods of one of the Gamea 2-4. We induced risk neutrality using the Roth-Malouf procedure, Rvth and Malouf [1979j and Berg et al. [1986~. Each player was randomly designated a sender or receiver at the beginning of an experiment and remained so for all perioda of the experiment. Each period of each sender-receiver game had the following atructure. Firet, senders and receivers were paired using a random matching procedure. Second, types were independently and identically drawn for each aender; each type was equally likely. Senders were then informed of their respective typea. In the message stage of the game, senders sent a meaeage to the receivers with which they were paired. In the action stage, each receiver chose an action after receiving their respective sender's tnessage. Each sender-receíver pair then learned the aender's type, message sent, actán taken and points earned in the period. Finally, all players received information about the senders; in particular, they viewed a ólmttuctiona ere sveilaóle from the suthon upon tequnt.
aummary of the aender types drawn and the nteaeages~ent by lhe reepective sender typea for the current and all previoua periode.
We choae the etructure of Game 1 to provide playera with experience in experimental procedures and to enaure that playere understood the atructure of a sender-receiver game, the message apace, and the populstion hiatory. Ae will be evident in eeetion 4, eubjects tound the taeks pre~ented by Gamea 2-4 quite difficult, even wilh the experience gained in Came l. The taek would be excessively diflicult if participanta Iacked the opportunity to play Game 1 first. Specifi~ally, Blume, DeJong, Kim and Sprinkle [1997) compare play in relntively simpler gamea than Gamea 2-4 with and without a airrtilar firot~eaeion. They find that the outcomes of the second seasion games are aimilar atroaa treatmenta; however, play convergea to lheae outtotnea slowly and lem complelely when players do not participate in the firat seasion. The message space tor Game 1 correaponded to the firat four lettera of the alphabet; thus, the aize of the mesaage apace ia the emalleet aize that exteede the cardinality of the type spaze. Note also that in order to evaluate the role of focal point effects (or a prion coordination, payoRa of the separating outcomea for types tt and t3 are on the oft-diagonal; i.e., for type tt (t3) payotfs are poeitive if aztion a3 (at) is taken. Thia does not affect the fundamental incentive atructure o( the game but makes it more difficult to coordinate on a pnori grounde. It is still paaeible to indicate the second type, tz, by the second ktter of the alphabet, B, in order to induce the second aetion, uz. For the firat letter of the alphabet, on the other hand, there are two conflicting natural associations, one with the firol type, the other with the first action (aimilarly for the third and fourth letter).
As detailed in the resulta and analysia section, thia givea riae to intetesting coordination issuea in Game l. For the literal meaning treatments, Games 2, 3 and 4 were run for three replications using the message space M-{1,2,3,4,5), guch that messagea correaponded to the five actions of the receivera. For the meaningless meseage treatments we ran the same gamea, uaing the measage space M-{i6,~,~,~).r ln additiun, we endowed participants with difTerent representatáns and orderings of thc message space. For example, a megaage represeMed as' for one set o[ pazticipants was represented as 96 for another eet of participanta. We informed participants that such representations were used and were stable throughout the experiment; however, participants were not informed of the specific mappinga assigned. This purpose o( using this procedure was to destroy all conceivable foral points that participants might have used for a pnon coordination on messages.
As in Session 1, in Session ll participants received the same aggregate information about the population: the distribution of sender types drawn and rFor the literel meaning treatmenta, the choice of the mea~ege spece meet~lw~o objectivn: (1) Its size exceerla the cardinality of the tYpe rpace, anA (7) meaning sre eaaily undentood -ue inatructions to tal~e a particular action. For lhe meeningleu messwge lrcumenlr, the~ise n( the meseage space ia the minimum aize that exceed~lhe number o! rmAa tyye. the measages aent by the respective aender types. For the meaninglesa-meseage treatmenta, thie information was diaplayed in terma of each pazticipant's repreeentation and ordering of the measage apace. The information was provided for the current and all previous perioda of the aeeaion.
Beforc each game, we rcad the inatructions aloud to each cohort, and parlicipanta individually filkd out questionnairea confirming their knowledge and underetanding of the inatructiona. We then went over the queationnaire orally and anawered queationa. Each replication laated from two and one-half to three and one-quarter houra, during which participanta earned between fifteen and fifty-four dollara in caeh.
R.esults and Analysis

Game 1
We introduce Game 1 into our experimenta primarily to familiariu pazticipanta with sender-receiver gamea and the learning environment, with the intent of making the kazning task manageable in gamea with complex incentive atructurea. However, Came 1 is of conaiderable intereet in ita own right. It demonatratea what can be learned and how fast when the incentive atructure ia aimple and it validatea our concern about focal pointa. The esaential propertiea of the Sesaion 1 outcomea are aummarised in Table I . Under the null hypothesis of independence of typea and actions, the diatribution of the proportion of type-action pairs conaistent with separation is centered at 33oIo. Using a t-test, with the finat-period results in each replication aerving as independent observations, we can reject the null hypothesis of independence at p~.Ol (t -18.85, 17 d.J.). Interestingly, we can also reject the null hypotheaie of independence using the first period reaulta p G .O1 (t -4.70, 17 d. f.) . Ae explained in more detail below, thia is likely evidence of a focal point eNect. There is a relatively large proportion of (t2, a2) paire in the initial period because a large number of senders and receivers from the beginning linked message "B" to type t2.
In addition to outcomes, it is interesting to aee which measagea were used and which types they indicated. The type-meseage associationa, aggregated over the final five periods, are reported in 1'able 2. Senden ueed the fint three messagea of the alphabet to signal the three paesible types. Thia ia one manifeatation of focal poinl effecte. The other is that measage B was used to indicate type t~ín all 15 replications. This again is a natural focal point, considering that it aasocistea the aecoad letter of the alphabet with the eeeoad type for whom bolh senden and receivero prefer the aecoad action. Thia focal point effect is bluMed for the other two typea, because for example, the optimal action for the third type t3 is the fint action a~, and senden and receiven cannot a pnori coordinate on whether messagea should signal types or actions. Indeed we obaerve that measage A is sometimes sent by type t~and sometimea by type ta. Formally, the hypotheais that in the final outcome the type-mesaagea pain ( t~, A) and (t1,C) are equally likely cannot be rcjected in a two-tailed binomial teat (p ] .48).
The data also suggeat that initial precedenta for type-message associationa predict terminal type-measage asaociationa. Thia is obvious for measage "B." In addition, in 15 out of 18 replicatána, if the initial ( fint five periods) proportion o[ (t~,A) and (tg,C) pain exceeded (wss leas than) the initial proportion of (f~,C) and (ta,A) pain then the same relation held in the last period. Figure 5 examines the time patha that kd to theae outcomes. In each typeaction cell, (t;,a;), we measure the frequency of action a; conditional on the true type being t;, as a five-period moving average over the duration of the treatment, averaged over replicationa. Note that convergence to the final separsting outcome takea time. Thia is interesting becauae ratronal playen in most inetancea could use play in the fint period as a precedent that would allow them to perfectly coordinate in the second period and all aubaequent perioda.
Games with Literal Meaninge
The difficulty of the learning taek dependa both on the nature of the message space (messages with or without literal meaninga) and on the incentive atructure (simple or complex). 1Yith our Session 1 games we examine one of the four paasible combinations, namely a simple incentive structure in conjunction with (largely) meaningleas messages, and get definite final outcomea. It atanda to reason that outcomea would be equally determinate with a aimple incentive structure and literal meaninga. Therefore we proceed 6y conaidering literal meanings combined with more complex incentive structures.
We have conaidered three treatments, Game 2, 3, and 4 with three replications for each treatment. The outcomes, i.e. the type-action asaociations over the final fivc periods, aze reported in Table 3 . , and 8896 (a.d.-.05) are conaistent with a separating equilibrium. Note however that in each replication type t3 receives action a~with poaitive probability. Thia action would be optimal against a message sent by both types tt and tz but not in reaponx to a meaeage that identifies type ta. We will see below, in the analyeis of mcssages, that type t2 sendere overwhelmingly "requested" their favorite action a~. Some oC the receivers then displayed "sucker behavior" by taking action a~, as requeated, rather than making the inference that only type ty was making that request. as independent obaervationa, we can reject the null-hypothesis of independence in favor of PCI tor Gama 2-4 (Isrgeat p G.Ol). In addition, for Gante 2 we can reject the null-hypothesis of independence in favor of xparation at p G.Ol (t -23.29, 2 d.J.); for Game 3 we can reject the null-hypothesia of independence in favor of partial pooling at p G.03 (t -4.84, 2 d.J.) and in favor of separation at p G .03 (t -4.45, 2 d.J.); for Game 4 we can reject the null-hypothesis of independence in favor of sepustion at p G.OI (t -11.85, 2 d.J.). Beyond this, no other outcomea where significant at p C.05. Intereetingly, Nash equilibrium u problematic in all thrce treatments. In the Game 2 treatment it is undermined by atable aucker behavior, in the Game 3 treatment because type tl and tz senders receive both separating and partial pooling actiona, and in the Game 4 treatment because type tl managea to obtain his favorite (nonequilibrium) action and because type ta is either identified or mistaken for type tt (neither of which ia part o[ any equilibrium).
In the three replications of Came 3, the outcome is consistent with PCI
For Game 4 we obaerve an intereating shiR from initial to terminal play as seen from a comparison of the terminal play data in Table 3 and the initial play data in Table 4 below. The fact that stands out is that initially hardly any tz typea receive action a~whereas in lhe end there is a considerabk proportion of such type-action pairs. One interpretation is that initially most aendera send messages thal if believed would maximize their payotTs. Receivers who may initially be credubus and take the correaponding actions, eventually learn to identify types at which point it becomes advantageoue for ez typee to mimic t~typee. Terminal play shows that some of the aenders underatand the incentives and mimic tt typea. The next logical step in this sequence would be for receivers to resort to the partial pooling action a~againat the message "1," whieh is now common for types tl and lz. Note that this atep is not taken and therefore nonequilibrium play appeara fairly stable.
The messagea that were sent by the various types over the last five perioda are reported in Table 5 .
eCompsre Tsble l l below, l6 s Llt~e~l Ywinp . l~~d~n Type-Mm~ge Auxluirn~-Finu Five PenodT able 5 shows that in all three replications of Game 2, the types sent those messages that, had the receivere interpreted them ae recommended actions and followed the recommendation, would guarantee the highest sender payoff. The handful oC exceptions can be iMerpreted as truthful revelatione of type. Essentially the same can be said about the Game 3 replications, except that in one replication there is a significant percentage of inessages whox literal meaning is a request for a separating action, even though the types involved would prefer not to be identified. Moreover, the sendera in Game 3 exhibited partial pooling behavioc Specifically, g696 of the type-message paira in Game 3 are consistent with partial pooling, while only 4296 are conaistent with separation. In the Game 4 replications again mast types send messages that eflectively ask for their favorite replies. Remarkable is that for type ti the requested action ai ia not part of any equilibrium; nevertheless the message "1" is sent by all type tI's in the last five periods oC all replications and is almost alwaye succeasful. The second remarkable fact ia that in all three replications over the final five periods we find a significant percentage of type tz's sending message ul," thua mimicking lhc behavior oC type ti's. Note that type tz prefers being misidenlified as type ti rather than being identified as type tz. The other message frequently sent by type t,'s is "4," a request for their favorite reply. Receivers sorrtetimes follow the request but more often they correctly identify who sends that message and reply with az inslead of a4 (see Table 7 , below).
The attempt o( type EZ's to mimic type ti's that we found for the terminal play is not present in initial play, as shown in Table B pparently, it takes time for receivers to correctly link the message "4" to type t7, and then for type t~aendero to discover that they are better oFf mimicking tt thsn being identified For the most part receivero did not blindly follow instructions but instead correctly identified the typea who would most benefit Gom the instructions being followed, and responded accordingly. Thu can be seen from Table 7 , which reports the actions taken by receivero after the various measages. Table 7 shows how the deviations from fully separating play in Game 2, from partial pooling equilibrium play in Game 3 and from equilibrium in Game 4 arise. In Game 2 it is receivera who follow inatructions (a~after "4") without realizing the incentive implications. In that sense receivers prove gullible. It is interesting that even with session I and considerable experienee with Game 2 itself, this sutker behavior does not vanish.s For Game 3, the obaervationa 9Sucker óchaviar in cheap-tallc ssmn hr sóo óeen rcported in Farsythe, Lundholm end Riets (1995(. An allernative etplsnation for what we inlerpret r~udcer behavior ia thet ã rtain fraction of players have prckrcnce rar altruism r di~cen~cd for exampk in Andreoni end Miller (1997) , snd Andreoni, Brown and Vestelund (1997j. From thst pmpective, onc can vie~v the receiver i choice of sn action, conditional on type t~havina been rcveskd, much IB that deviate from partial pooling behavior are not as eaaily explnined; they ariae out of action az being taken in response to the partial pooling measage 4, and from a tendency toward separation in the aecond replication of Game 3. For lhe Game 4 treatmente we eee that meesage "1" moatly induced action af, the favorite reply of type tt. Message "4" waa either taken at face value, inducing action a~, or, more frequently, correctly interpreted sa coming from type t7, in which case action a~was taken. Here again it ia interqting to point out the difference between terminal play and initial play, as reported in Table 8 .
As seen trom a comparison of Tablea 7 and 8 receivera become leas gullible with experience. Message "4" is more likely to induce action a~during the final five periods than during the initial 5 perioda of Game 4.
Despite the Cact that literal meanings are available, karning takee place in all three treatmenta. However, this karning benefite the group in only the Game 2 and the Game 3 treatments where, on average, from the firat five to the laat five periods, payoBs increase for both aenders and reteivere. Aa Table 9 reveala, in Game 4 payoNa fall in all three replicationa for both eendera and receivera.
like a dictetor aame: The teceiver can erytoit the infarttution and chooae a larfie ahne far him"el( or imteed forao the benefit from uuns the infornution. One interpretuion of our dwts ie that therc 's s certain perttntaae of dtrunUc receiven. While re feel thu lhi~ia a potentially fruitful wsy to look at the dsta, thir apptoadt would have to erylain why, r rwted helow, payoFfs decline over time, why thete i~a lar`e percentaae ot inelt;tient lypoactwn pain (tz, at ), why in the final periods there i~a hishn incidence of mimicry, and why re dc. not observe. the same phenomena with meaninalev mew6a. Campare for exsmple the elata on (;etne 2 in '1'ahle lo, when-action a~à neva teken in two replicatiorr utd nol tied to a psrticulsr type in the other, or, lhe Ceme~data in Table 10 , where at is jwt r oBen ssx~ásled with lype tl se with !y. The decreaae in payofla in the Game 4 treatment can be explained by players moving from naive truthtelling and gullibility to a more eophisticated responae to the inceMives, which rule out a truthtelling equilibrium. Note that in the process the a priori meaninga of ineesages deteriorate: Receivers learn not to believe certain implied atatements and senden undermine the meaning ot meseages through mimicry.
Í9
The time patha leading to theae outcomea are ahown in Figure 6 , aggregated over all three replications o[ Game 2, in Figure 7 tor Game 3, and in Figure B for Game 4. The feature that stande out in all three treatmenta ia that while behavár is consiatent with PCI, there is peraiatent oon-equilibrium play. Acroae all 90 periods, type tz receivea both actiona az and a4 with poaitive probability in Game 2, typee tl and t7 receive actiona al, az and a4 with poaitive probability in Game 3, and type tl receives action al nearly all the time in Game 4.
Gamea with Meaninglesa Messages
From an evolutionary perspective, the moat interesting environment is one where incentive atructures are complex and messagea are a pnori meaningless. Then, learning must occur [or communication to come about and the learning procesa muat overcome whatever divergence of interest there is between sendera and receivers.
We consider three treatmenta (parallel to the previous section), Game 2, Game 3, and Game 4 all of which utílized the same Sesaion 1 gamea, with three types and four measages.to The outcomea, i.e. the type-adion aesociations over the final five perioda, are reported in Table 10 . toDW tor tro veriatiom ot Game 4, Gune 2A, which wr run wilh~twomereóe teuion 1, and Game 28, whidt wr run with a thtee-mersóe wnrion 1 un he ohtained ttpon teqttal (rom the authon. The result~~re brodly cansittent wilh the testJts rcpottsd here. The firat thing to note about theae outcomea is that we can reject the hypothesis H1 that the pooling action ia the rnoat frequent actron. Aggregated over replications and treatmenta, the frequency of the pooling action in the laat five periods is leee than 2096. While therc are two replicationa (Game 2 Rep 3 and Game 3 Rep 2) in which the frequency of the pooling action ia high, it never comes cloae to 10096 as would be required Cor a pooling outcome.
A casual inapection of the data auggeeta that in addition to the pooling hypotheais being tejected, communication occura over the final five periode. Fw example, two of the Came 2 and one of the Game 3 replicationa are cloee to full separation, and type t3 appeara to be well identified in at least two replicationa in each of the three treatments.
In our meaningless mesaage treatmenta outcomes are noisier than in the literal meaning treatments. For that reaeon we adopt the following approach toward betler identifying communication outcomea: First we form claseea of type-action pairs that are conaiateM with diRerent forms of communitatron; second we calculate the frequency with which type-actiona paira fall into each class; finally we ask whether this Crequency could have been generated by a uniform distribution over all type-action paira.
The following tables serve to report frequenciea of partia) common intereat play (PCI), separaling play (S), partial pooling equilibrium play ( PPE), pooling equilibrium play (PF,), the frequency of PCI play within the non-pooling play (PCI`PE), and the frequency of partial pooling equilibrium play within the non-pooling play (PPF,`PE). Outccme frequencies are obtained according to Table 11 and reported in Table 12. Recall that an outcome for a sender-receiver game is a joint probability distribution over typea and action. For example the probability distributioñ~s ociated with a PCI outcome assigna poaitive probability to a cell in Table 11 if md only if that cell containa a PCI-label (u a"PCI-cell"). To obtain the frequency of PCI play [or the final 5 perioda we divide the number of observations in PCI-cells by 30, the total number of observationa over the last five periods.
To obtain the frequency of PCI`PE play we divide the number of observatrona in PCI-cells by the total number of observationa that do not belong to a PE-cell. The frequenciee of the other outcomea are conatructed analogously. for PPE`PE). For example, the obaerved PCI frequency exceeds the benchmark frequency in silt out of nine replications, the PCI`PE frequency exceeda the benchmark frequency in eight out of nine caeea. Therefore, there is only one replication in which PCI has no explanatory power. Note however that for thia replicatron the PPE`PE frequency (. 46) exceeds the benchmark frequency (.25), auggesting that aome communication does indeed occur, even in thia replication. Table 12 also reporta the pvaluea for a simpk t-test (2 d.f.) of the nullhypothesis that the data where generated by a uniform diatribution (noiae) against the alternative that the frequency of the outcomea uron the three replications within euh treatment exceeda the unitorm diatribution frequency. Note, for example, that for Game 2 we can (muginally) rcject the noiae hypotheais in Cavor of PCI, S and PCI`PE. For Gsme 3, we can marginally reject the noise hypothesis in favor of PPE. And for Game 4, we can marginally reject the noise hypothesis in Cavor o[ PCI`PE.
In principle,senders may separate, partially separate,etc. wilhout receiven responding appropriately. This auggesta that the outcome data, u rcported in Table 12 , understate the extent of communicalion; a wrong nwaage ( in terms of current population play) may be correctly interpreted or a rrwaage that is correctly interpreted ( given the current etate of population play) may have been sent by ehe wrong type. To partially addreas thie, we report aender play in Tabk 13. The data in Table l3 confirm our earlier observatàn that there appears lo be a significant amount oC communication in all three treatmenta. Typea can frequently be identified by their message. As expected, the sender data (Tabk 13) by themselves are "cleaner" then the outcome data (Table 12 ). For exampk in each treatment, there are two replications in which type ta senda only one of the four possible measagea.
Interestingly, in each replication of the Game 4 trcatment, lhere exists a message identifying type tt well enough for ution at to be lhe unique best reply, even though such an identification is not part of any equilibrium. Note that this phenomenon is conaistent with what we found in the correaponding treatment with literal meanings.
Yeen{salar Yer~r -aaoden T Meu
Aaaociatiau -Fiml Five Periode 
The tneaningless message -complex incentive treatmenta demonstrate that with sutficient time players can learn to communicate even under adverse conditiuns. flowever, the learning process is both abwer and less complete than with either simple incentives or meaningful mesaagea. This is confirmed by Figurea 9-11, which graph the evolution of outcomes as a function of time, aggregated ovcr replications. Eigure 9 reports the data for the three replicationa of Catne 2, Figure 10 for Came 3, and Figure 11 for Game 4. In esch type-actán cell (t;,a;) we graph the obeervations of that type type-action pair ae a percentage of observations of type t;, over five period intervals, as a rolling average from period 1 to period 40.
Intereatingly, while the meaningkas meaaege data (Fig.~11) are noisier than the literal meaning data (Fíg. 6-8), they display eome of the same tendencies, toward aeparation in Game 2, toward identification of type t3 in all three treatments, and toward identification over a significant length of time for type t~in Game 4.
Evaluation of Hypothesee
We esaeas the validity of our hypotheaea in a four-cell reference frame in which the nature of the message apace, literal vs. meaninglesa, interacts with the structure of incentivea, simple va. complex.
The moet unambiguoue results are obtained with aimple incentives and meaningkss messagea, i.e. in our Seasàn 1 games. We can reject the hypotheses that communication does not matter, i.e. that actiona are independent of types (H1), that PCI does not matter (H2), and that (aeparating) equilibrium play does not matter (H3c). The outcomea obeerved are conaiatent with ex ante efficiency, influentiality and pasa the neologiam proofnesa te~t; i.e. H3d-f can all be rejeeted. We did not exsmine the simple inceotive -literal meaning cell because it aeema reasonable to expect that the reault would be the same.
Fairly clean resulte ariae aleo when we combine complex incentivea with Iiteral meaninge. We can reject H1, the hypotheais that there will be no communication, i.e. that the pooling action is the maet frequent action, for every replication of every treatment. We can also reject H2, the hypothesis that PCI is irrelevant, for each one of the replicatione. Equilibrium play ia more problematic becauae in each case there ia a systematic deviation Gom equilibrium. We find that in Game 2 all typea are fully identified by their measage and that moat of the time receivers respond accordingly. Therefore we can reject the hypd.hesis that sepatating equilibrium play does not matter (li3c). However in all three replications of Game 2, there are eome receivera who appear creduloua and take the partial pooling responae after type tz's me~age, a departure from aeparating equilibrium. For Game 3 we can alao reject the hypothesis that equilibrium play doee not matter (H3b-H3f). However, with so many hypotheses to reject, we suffer from an embarrassment oC riches; while the only outcome that is claee to an equilibrium ia a partial pooling outcome, the evidence ie not decisive (H3b and H3c), and the same can be said for the aelection triteria of effieiency (H3d), influentiality (H3e), and refinementa (H3[). In Game 4 we find that type t~is fully identified in all three replications, and indeed we can reject the hypothesis that separating outcomea do not matter (H3e). Note however that this game dcea not have a separating equilibrium. Thus, we see a robuat departure from equilibrium play. Hecause of the nonexistence of a neologiam-proof equilibrium we cannot reject hypothaia H3f. However, it is interdting to note that the departure from equilibrium play is in the direetion~uggeated by the refinement literature; according to the refinement literature, in any equilibrium of this game type t~would be abk to identify hirrtaelf througó a credibk neologiam. Overall, tor gamea with literal meanings we find that both equilibrium predictions and criteria that attempt to sekct among equJibria ( efficiency, influentiality, refinements) are problematic.
Even for the combination of complex incentivea and meaningkas rtxssagea there is enough structure in outcomea to suggeat that communication does occur; and where it doea occur it is consistent with PCI. We can reject the nocommunication hypotheais ( H1). For the Came 2 data we can also ( marginally) reject the hypothesis that separating equilibrium ia irrelevant ( H3c), implying, in this game, a rejection of the hypotheses H3d-H3f that efficiency, influentiality and refinementa do not matter. If we ignore pooling actions, we can akw reject the hypothesie that PCI ia irrelevant ( H2). For Game 3 we can ( marginally) reject the hypotheais that paztia! pooling equilibrium play is irrekvant for explaining the data ( H36); as a eonsequence we can akw rejeet lhe hypothesia that efficiency does not matter ( H3d). The evidence on influentiality (H3e), and refinements ( H3O is mixed because there ia one replication with atrong separating tendencies; separation would favor influentiality whereas only the paztial pooling equilibrium ia neologism proof. Note that in this game the partial pooling equilibrium outcome is one of the two equilibrium outcomes that are consiatent with the PCI condition. Thus, for this geme, while the nonequilibrium version of PCI has not much explanatory power, an equilibrium version of hypotheais ( H2) that PCI is irrelevant can be rejected. For Game 4 we can marginally reject the hypothesis that aeparating outcomes do not matter (H3c); however, this game has no separating equilibrium. Indeed, we cannot reject the hypotheses of irrelevance of pooling equilibria ( H3a) and partial pooling equilibria (H36) On the other hand, we find that the portion of type-action pairs that dces not involve a pooling action can be explained in terma of PCI (intuitively, where receivers troubled themselves with decoding messagea, they found them informative). Overall, PCI appears to have aome explanatory power for all three meaningless message treatmenta; to obtain this explanatory power we sometirnes have to focus on nonpooling actions ( Game 4) or combine the PCI prediction with an equilibrium prediction (Game 2).
Conclusion
There is strong intuition that at least some of the efficiency gains from sharing private information will be realized if communication is costless. This intuition hav been used to motivate the inveatigation of efficient communication in applied work and has been given formal expression both in the cheap-talk refinement literature and in the evolutionazy literature.
Our experimental atudy demonatratea that with aufficient incentive alignment there are indeed forcea favoring eKective communication. We find that lhese forcee are likely to be deciaive if either incentivee are closely aligned and aimple or if participanta have accesa to measagea with pre-eatablished meaninga. Participanta make use of focal pointe for a priori coordination on meanings, both when meanings sre given explicitly and when they suggeat themselvea. Sometimes, when the provided meanings take the form of instructions, receivers appear creduloua by aimply following inatructions rather than taking into account the sender's incentives. Even if incentivea are only imperfectly aligned and meaninga have to emerge endogenously, we observe etfective communication in moet cases. As might be expected, with both imperfect incentive alignment and meaningkas messagea, karning takea more time and is lesa compkte.
While there is evidence for effective communication, the focus of the applied literature on selecting equilibria receives lesa aupport. Equilibria sometimea help in understanding the data. However, for moderately complicated incentivea there ie no guarantee that equilibrium will be attained after a moderate length of time. There is even ksa evidence that we can guarantee a particular equilibrium selection criterion to be satisfied. Selection criteria that discriminate among equilibria on the grounda ot influentiality, ex ante efficiency or refinernents do not capture the syetematic deviationa from equilibrium play that we do obaerve. In addition they may both under-and overpredict the eztent of communication; e.g. we observe communication where refinements reject all equilibrie, we observe a tendency toward partial pooling play where influentiality would predict full separation, and for one of our incentive atructurea (Game 3) we observe one of two possible ex ante efficient equilibria in a given treatment, but not the other. Multiple equilibria, lack of convergence to equilíbrium, and systematic deviationa from equilibrium play (like adherence to focal pointe and atable sucker behavior) all appear poasible. This makes leas demanding predictive tools uaeful.
The partial common intere~t condition, which appeare both in the cheaptalk refinement literature and the evolutionary literature, doea a fairly good job of organiaing our data. Both in the simple incentive -meaninglesa message case and with literal meaninga, all our final outcomea are consistent with PCI. With meaningkss messagea and only partial incentive alignment PCI explains two thirds of our data in six out of nine replicationa and explains three-fourtha of the non-pooling data in two out of the remaining three replications. Across all our replications, lhere is only one in which PCI has no explanatory power. FIGURE 5(Game I): For the eighteen replications of Game 1(see Figure 1 for a deacription of Game I) thia figure p~resents the ticne paths that led to the outcomes presented in Table I . Specifically, for each replication of Game I we órst measure, over Sve-period intervals, the frequency of play (i.e., the number ofa" t, pairs) in each of the nine cells of Game 1. Nezt, we divide each of these frequencies by the respective frequency of t; s over these five-period intervals to measure, for each aender type, the proportion of play of each action. Finally, for purposes of parsimony and given the similarity of the outcomes over replications, these psoportions are averaged acroas replications. 2 for a description ofGame 2) with Gteral meanings, this figure presenta the time paths that led to the outeomes preaented in Table 3 . SpeeiScally, for each replication of Game 2 with literal meanings, we órst meesure, over 5ve-period intenrals, the frequenry of play ( i.e., the number of a, , t, peirs) in eseh of the fifteen cells of Game 2. Nest, we divide each of these Gequencies by the respective frequency of t;s over these 6ve-period intervals to measure, for each sender type, the proportion of play of each action. Finally, for purposes of parsimonq and given the general similarity of the outcomes over replicatione, these proportions are averaged across replications. Figure 3 for a description of Game 3) with literal meanings, thia figure presenta the time paths that led to the outcomes presented in Table 3 . Specifieally, for each replicatian ofGame 3 with literal meanings, we first messure, over óve-period intervals, the frequeary of plqy (i.e., the number of a" t, pairs) in eaeh of the fifteen eells of Game 3. Ne:t, we divide each of these frequenciea by the reapective frequency of t;s aver theae 5ve-period intervals to measure, for each sender type, the proportion of plaq of each action. Finally, for purposea of persimony and given the general similarity of the outcomes over replicationa, these proportions are averaged acrosa replications. Figure 4 for a description of Game 4) with literal meanings, this 5gure presents the time paths that led to the outcomes p~resented in Table 3 . Speeifically, for eaeh replication of Game 4 with literal meanings, we first measure, over five-period intervals, the frequency of play (i.e., the M ofa" t, pairs) in each of We fifteen celLs of Game 4. Ne:t, we divide each ofthese frequencies by the reapective frequency oft,'s over these five-period intervals to measure, for each sender type, the proportion of play of each action. Finally, for purposes of parsimony and given the general similarity of the outcomea over replications, these proportions are averaged across replications.
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AdionM~. FIGUR.E 9(Game 2 with Meaningless Measagea): For the three replications of Game 2(see Figure 2 for a description of Game 2) with meaningless messages, this figure presents the time paths that led to the outcomes presented in Table 10 . Specifically, for each replication of Game 2 with meaningless messages, we first measure, over Sve-period intervals, the frequency of play (i.e., the N ofa" t, pairs) ia each of the fifteen cells of Game 2. Nert, we divide each of these frequencies by the respective frequency oft;s over these five-period intervals to measure, for each sender type, the proportion of play of each aetion. Finally, for purposes of parsimony and given the rough similarity of the outcomes over replicationa, these proportions are averaged across replications. Table 10 . Speci6eally, for eaeh replieation of Game 3 with meaniagless messages, we first measure, wer 5ve.period intervals, the frequenry of play ( i.e., the N of a" t, pairs) in each of the ófteen cells of Game 3. Neat, we divide each of theae Eequencies by the respective frequency of e;s over these five-period intervals to measure, for each sender type, the proportion of play of eaeh action. Finally, for purposea of parsimony and given the rough similarity of the outcomes over replications, these proportions are averaged acroes replications. Figure 4 for a deaciption of Game 4) with meaningless messagea, this 5gure presents the time patbs that led to the outeomes preaented in Table 10 . Specifically, for each repGcation of Game 4 with meaningless messages, we first measure, over five-period intervals, the frequency of play ( i.e., the number of a, , t, pairs) in each of the ófteen cells of Game 4. Next, we divide each of these frequenciea by the respecdve frequenty of t;s over these Sve-period intervals to measure, for each sender type, the proportion of play of each action. Finally, for purposes of parsimony and given the rough similarity of the outcomes over replications, these proportions are averaged acrosa replications.
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